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Discussing Advocacy Skills in 
Traditional Doctrinal Courses
Stephen A. Newman
Can teaching students in doctrinal courses, using traditional case-oriented 
materials, convey some of the skills lawyers need to practice law effectively? 
While the recent interest in and debate over training practice-ready lawyers 
makes this a timely question, my thinking about this harks back to the mid-
1990s, when Harry Wellington, then dean of New York Law School,1 suggested 
that faculty members consider teaching law from the lawyer’s perspective 
rather than from the perspective of either the judge or the legal scholar.2 
Clinical courses had done this from the outset, of course, but traditional 
doctrinal courses commonly aimed to teach legal doctrines by studying 
judicial opinions in a scholarly way. Because practicing law requires the skill 
of case analysis and the application of legal concepts, it is important to study 
the opinions of judges in an academically rigorous way.
In taking up Dean Wellington’s challenge, my goal in teaching my 
introductory course in family law was to incorporate a variety of ideas about 
practical legal skills in class discussions about judicial opinions. This would 
not convert the course into a skills course. But regular additions to class 
discussion of such matters as gathering evidence, using narrative techniques 
in presenting evidence, narrowing legal claims, naming parties, counseling 
clients, and dealing with experts could help students see the connections 
between doctrinal law and practice, stimulate thinking about how lawyers 
go about making a persuasive case on behalf of their clients, and reinforce 
the students’ learning in skills and experiential learning courses. I offer 
some examples from my own course, with the expectation that instructors of 
other doctrinal courses will have their own ideas for incorporating into class 
discussions these ways of thinking about the lawyer’s job.
1. Adam Liptak, Harry H. Wellington, Dean at Yale and a Labor Law Expert, Dies at 84, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/nyregion/harry-h-wellington-former-
dean-of-yale-law-school-dies-at-84.html.
2. See, e.g., Harry H. Wellington, Challenges to Legal Education: The “Two Cultures” Phenomenon, 37 J. 
LegaL educ. 327 (1987). 
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Finding and Presenting Evidence
You might not know it from examining most casebooks, but practicing 
lawyers must give serious, sustained attention to gathering evidence in every 
case. They must search it out, discuss it with their clients, and present it to 
judges in motions, at trial, and on appeal. So it seems appropriate to draw 
attention to this crucial aspect of the lawyer’s work during class discussions of 
traditional cases. 
Traditional appellate opinions give readers the facts, and so elide the effort 
lawyers make to find those facts. Often, though, appellate judges will remand 
a case for further proceedings, and this gives the instructor an opportunity 
to open up for discussion the fact-gathering necessitated by the new hearing 
in the case. The family law classic Matter of Baby M.3 provides an example. In 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, Mary Beth Whitehead, who contracted with 
William Stern to be a “surrogate mother” for his child, sought custody of the 
child or, alternatively, visitation with the child.4 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court explained its negative feeling about surrogacy contracts,5 and the case 
is an excellent vehicle for discussing problems raised by new reproductive 
technologies. But after the court ruled the surrogacy contract against public 
policy and unenforceable, and affirmed the determination that the Sterns 
should be awarded custody, it remanded the matter for a hearing on Ms. 
Whitehead’s visitation rights.6
The remand presents an opportunity to ask students to work out the 
narrative line of the Sterns’ argument that, in the best interests of the child, 
Ms. Whitehead’s contact with the child should be limited and even delayed 
for years, and Whitehead’s contrary argument that visitation should be 
generous and begin immediately. The students can also be asked to consider 
what evidence might support Whitehead in her quest for visitation, and 
whom she might call to testify. The Sterns’ argument that visitation would 
create an unstable and upsetting situation for the child might be countered 
by evidence derived from the experience of visitation during the pendency of 
the litigation. Baby M.’s situation might be analogized to the circumstances 
in numerous divorce cases, where a parent with custody has a new spouse, 
yet must respect the visitation rights of the other parent. The case on remand 
is reported,7 enabling the professor to inform the students about the actual 
evidence, arguments, and outcome in the remanded case. 
3. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
4. Id. at 1234-35.
5. Id. at 1240-47.
6. Id. at 1234-35.
7. 542 A.2d 52 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1988). Another remanded custody matter is Bennett v. Marrow, 
399 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1977), on remand from Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 (1976). 
This case highlights the testimony of an expert in psychology from Yale University that 
aligns well with the theories propounded in Joseph goLdsTeiN, eT aL., BeYoNd The BesT 
iNTeresTs of The chiLd (1973).
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A U.S. Supreme Court case, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, gives law students a 
chance to think about fact-gathering in a quasi-criminal case involving a 
juvenile’s confession to unlawful conduct.8 School officials escorted a 13-year-
old boy to a room in the school for questioning by the police about burglaries 
committed in the neighborhood.9 The youth was questioned for 30 minutes 
and released upon the conclusion of the school day, after he incriminated 
himself by his answers.10 When a juvenile delinquency petition was filed 
against him, his lawyer argued that he had been “in custody” and therefore 
should have been given Miranda warnings.11 The state courts found he was 
not “in custody” and so not entitled to the warnings.12  On appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the issue decided was the narrow one of whether courts must 
take into account the age of the minor in determining whether he was “in 
custody” for Miranda purposes.13 The Supreme Court held that the age of 
the child was a mandatory factor in the analysis.14 It declared that the issue 
had to be resolved by a determination of “whether given the circumstances, a 
reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was . . . at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave.”15 The matter was remanded for further proceedings.16
Rather than give students the facts as recited by the court, I give them the 
court’s discussion of the legal standard for determining whether someone is in 
custody, and ask my students to grapple with the practical effect of the court’s 
ruling on the continuing litigation. What facts do they need to gather in the 
effort to argue that the boy was “in custody”? In a short time, students can 
usually come up with a series of questions about the facts of the interrogation 
that the boy’s lawyer must have answered (e.g., who was in the room, how 
many of those present were police officers, whether the officers were armed, 
whether the door was open or closed, locked or unlocked, blocked by officers 
or freely accessible, whether the boy was handcuffed or otherwise physically 
restrained, what was said to the boy about his obligation to answer questions 
and to remain in the room, how long the interrogation lasted, how it concluded, 
whether the boy ever asked to leave). This brief class discussion helps convey 
the idea that evidence gathering and asking the right questions to obtain the 
evidence are essential tasks for the lawyer, and often the key to winning or 
losing the case. 
8. 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
9. Id. at 2399-400.
10. Id. at 2400.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2402-08.
14. Id. at 2406.
15. Id. at 2407 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
16. J.D.B. 131 S. Ct. at 2408.
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Another example is Marvin v. Marvin, the landmark case from the California 
Supreme Court that recognized the right of an unmarried co-habitant, plaintiff 
Michelle Triola Marvin, to make claims for property division and support 
against her movie-star lover, Lee Marvin.17 The claim is popularly dubbed 
“palimony.”18 The case came to the state’s high court on a motion addressed 
to the sufficiency of the pleadings,19 and Michelle’s lawyer won a great victory 
in just keeping her claim alive. She was allowed to rely upon contract, implied 
contract, and equitable theories to recover on her claims, including recovery 
based on proof of her “reasonable expectations” upon termination of the 
relationship.20
To highlight the work of the practicing lawyer, I ask students to anticipate 
the case on remand. If Michelle could not prove the existence of an express 
contract (which she, in fact, couldn’t), how might she argue about her reasonable 
expectations? A brief discussion might elicit various ideas about each lawyer’s 
argument and search for supporting evidence. Michelle’s lawyer would want 
to tell a story focused on the sacrifice of her singing career, and her significant 
contributions as a homemaker and companion to Lee over the years of their 
living together. Students could then consider Lee’s strategy in response. Lee 
would want to minimize Michelle’s supposed sacrifice of career by showing 
she was just another struggling entertainer with limited prospects and a career 
going nowhere. Her contributions to Lee’s home could be minimized by 
pointing out the kind of domestic help Lee hired to do the housekeeping, 
cooking, cleaning, maintenance of grounds, etc. Lee could produce evidence 
of the benefits Michelle had already reaped from the relationship–e.g., gifts 
of furs, jewelry, clothing, and other goodies of the high life that movie stars 
enjoy in our society–and argue that she had been generously rewarded for 
whatever contributions she made. The case on remand is reported, enabling 
the instructor to tell the class how it all came out. Michelle won the battle in 
the California Supreme Court but lost the war on remand.21 She was awarded 
no money at all in the final round of adjudication of her claim.22 The benefits 
she reaped were substantial, the remand court found, and overwhelmed any 
contributions and sacrifices Michelle made.23 Only her lawyer became rich 
17. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
18. See Lina Guillen, Palimony, divorceNeT, http://www.divorcenet.com/states/nationwide/
palimony (last visited April 22, 2015).
19. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110-11.
20. Id. at 116-23.
21. Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1981).
22. Id. at 558-59.
23. The court found Lee contributed over $72,900 for Michelle’s sole benefit and some $221,400 
for their joint living expenses, plus substantial gifts for Michelle, in the five years they lived 
together. Id. at 557.
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and famous from the case (but he, too, lost the war, later serving a prison term 
for income tax evasion).24
As a final example, I use an oft-cited custody case not from the West 
Reporters, but from the Bible. Some judges write in their opinions that they 
wish that they had the wisdom of Solomon, or declare that a case is so close 
as to require Solomonic judgment.25 They refer, of course, to the venerable 
custody case reported in the Book of Kings. One version goes like this:
And the wise king judged the two women before him. Each had a child newly 
born, but one child had died. Each woman claimed the living child as her 
own. And the king said, “Fetch me a sword.”
And they brought him a sword. And the king said, “Divide the living child in 
two, and give half to the one, and half to the other.” Then spoke the woman 
whose the living child was, for her heart yearned upon her son, and she said, 
“Oh, my lord, give her the living child and in no wise slay it.” But the other 
said, “It shall be neither mine nor thine; divide it.” 
Then the king answered and said, “Give her the living child, and in no wise 
slay it; she is the mother of the child.” And all Israel heard of the judgment 
which the king had judged; and they feared the king; for they saw that the 
wisdom of God was in him, to do justice.26
When judges seek Solomonic wisdom, it is usually because the case is 
a close one, with the evidence very evenly split between the parties. But I 
suggest to the class that the biblical story is not about a close case. It is about a 
dispute resolved by overwhelming evidence favoring one party over the other. 
Solomon played two roles in this story, in terms of our modern legal system–
that of judge (the decision-maker) and that of lawyer (the evidence gatherer 
and presenter). It was Solomon’s brilliant evidentiary presentation that won the 
day. Solomon’s ingenious demonstration left no doubt about who was the true 
mother of the child. The lawyer’s job–to come forward with evidence, ideally 
evidence so persuasive that only one judgment seems possible–was dispatched 
with such effect that no one could question the judgment that inexorably 
24. See his obituary for the fascinating story Patrick Healy, Marvin Mitchelson, Father of 
Palimony, is Dead at 76, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/20/
obituaries/20Mitchelson.html.
25. See, e.g., Byron v. Davis, 950 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (“Lacking the wisdom of 
Solomon to decide this difficult question for two members of the clergy . . . .”); Ferguson 
v. Lewis, 31 So.3d. 5 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (“It is often said that chancellors must have the 
wisdom of Solomon in domestic cases. It may also be said that chancellors must have much 
more wisdom than Solomon when dealing with teenagers.”). For an interesting discussion 
of how the King Solomon story portrays the image of the ideal judge, see Linda L. Berger, 
How Embedded Knowledge Structures Affect Judicial Decision Making: A Rhetorical Analysis of Metaphor, 
Narrative, and Imagination in Child Custody Disputes, 18 s. caL. iNTerdisc. L.J. 259 (2009).
26.  1 Kings 3:16-28.
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followed. Solomon’s work as lawyer made the difference, and made his work 
as judge easy.27
Storytelling 
“Law lives in narrative” in the words of Professors Anthony Amsterdam and 
Jerome Bruner, in their extensive study Minding the Law.28 “Clients tell stories 
to lawyers, who must figure out what to make of what they hear. As clients 
and lawyers talk, the client’s story gets recast…If circumstances warrant the 
lawyers retell their clients’ stories in the form of pleas and arguments to judges 
and testimony to juries...Next, judges and jurors retell the stories to themselves 
or to each other in the form of instructions, deliberations, a verdict, a set of 
findings, or an opinion. And then it is the turn of journalists, commentators, 
and critics. This endless telling and retelling, casting and recasting is essential 
to the conduct of the law.”29 
Legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin proposed that the law itself is a 
continuing story, with each generation writing its own new chapter, while 
arguing over how the story should advance and who should be in position to 
do the writing.30
These matters can be brought down to concrete level in case discussions by 
recognizing not just the legal analysis, but the storytelling skills a lawyer must 
employ in presenting a case. Some ideas about doing this follow.
Succinct Statement of the Case
In many litigated cases, a judge first sees the case when a motion is made 
early in the litigation. And often enough (perhaps not yet having read any 
papers filed), the judge’s first question is “What’s this case about, counselor?” 
It is a valuable skill for lawyers to be ready to answer that question succinctly 
and well. Law professors might reconsider the common technique of asking 
students to recite the facts of a case, in some objective fashion, and instead 
ask students to answer the judge’s question from the point of view of a lawyer 
representing one of the parties (e.g., the plaintiff, or the party appealing). This 
will sensitize students to the lawyer’s difficulty in dealing with “the facts” of 
any case. Out of the welter of facts in any situation, what facts should be 
chosen in briefly telling the basic story of the case? Which facts need emphasis 
27. Another Solomon story is similarly focused on finding irresistible evidence. The King and 
the Bees, BaLdwiN proJecT, http://www.mainlesson.com/display.php?author=baldwin&bo
ok=people&story=bees (last visited April 22, 2015). The king was challenged to distinguish 
between a wreath of flowers and an artist’s masterful lifelike replica of the wreath. Id. 
Solomon could see no apparent difference between the two. Id. Then he asked that the 
window be thrown open. Id. A bee flew in and went directly to the true flowers. Id. Solomon 
had only to point to that wreath as nature’s creation, and the other as the artist’s. Id.
28. aNThoNY amsTerdam & Jerome BruNer, miNdiNg The Law (2000).
29. Id. at 110.
30. See roNaLd dworkiN, Law’s empire (1986).
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and which ones need to be minimized? How can the story be distilled down to 
a few essentials, in a way that is accurate and also persuasive? 
Judicial opinions rarely recite the facts of the case before the court in a way 
that is brief and yet compelling. It is worth calling attention to the instances 
in which courts do demonstrate this skill. In Dunphy v. Gregor, for example, the 
court related the facts of an automobile accident with a striking use of a few 
well-chosen, telling details.31 The plaintiff, Eileen Dunphy, sought damages 
for emotional distress she suffered when she witnessed the death of her co-
habitant and fiancé, who was hit by defendant’s truck on a highway when 
changing a tire. Justice Alan B. Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
described the incident this way:
Eileen Dunphy and Michael T. Burwell became engaged to marry in April 1988 
and began cohabitating two months later. The couple set a date of February 
29, 1992, for their wedding. On September 29, 1990, the couple responded 
to a friend’s telephone call for assistance in changing a tire on Route 80 in 
Mount Arlington. As Michael changed the left rear tire of the friend’s car 
on the shoulder of the roadway, he was struck by a car driven by defendant, 
James Gregor. After being struck by the vehicle, his body was either dragged 
or propelled 240 feet. Eileen, who had been standing approximately five feet 
from Michael, witnessed the impact, and ran to him immediately. Realizing 
that he was still alive, she cleared pebbles and blood from his mouth to ease 
his breathing. She attempted to subdue his hands and feet as they thrashed 
about, all the while talking to him in an effort to comfort him. The following 
day, after a night-long vigil at Dover General Hospital, Eileen was told that 
Michael Burwell had died as a result of his injuries.32
With a few carefully chosen details, the judge brings the scene vividly before 
our eyes. The account of the accident puts the plaintiff, Ms. Dunphy, in a very 
sympathetic light, and gives the reader a grasp on the profound emotional 
impact of the event on her. Add to the description a sentence defining the legal 
issue posed by the case – whether a non-family member should be permitted 
to sue in tort for emotional distress suffered when witnessing the fatal injury 
of a loved one–and you have an accurate, fact-based, and brief statement of 
the case. If it came from the plaintiff’s lawyer in reply to the “What’s this case 
about?” question, it would succeed in subtly beginning the lawyer’s effort to 
persuade the court to recognize his claim.33 
It is also worth noting when judicial opinions minimize key facts in order 
to bolster the opinion’s persuasiveness. An example is Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Dept. of Health,  in which parents sought to have their adult daughter, Nancy 
Cruzan, in a vegetative state with no hope of recovery, taken off life-support 
31. 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994).
32. Id. at 373.
33. The lawyer succeeded; the court recognized Ms. Dunphy’s tort claim, in broad terms that 
benefited all co-habitants in close, loving, intimate relationships. Id. at 379.
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systems.34 The description of her condition could certainly influence the 
acceptability of the arguments for and against withdrawal. The case split the 
court 5-4 in favor of the state of Missouri, which had denied the parents the 
right to make this decision without clear and convincing evidence of what 
their daughter would have wanted done.35 How did the justices on each side 
in the case characterize Nancy’s physical condition? In the majority’s account, 
she is “incompetent,” with “virtually no chance of recovering her cognitive 
faculties.”36 In the dissent’s account, Nancy is in a “twilight zone” between life 
and death, one that has lasted for six years and might continue for as many 
as thirty years, with a body that “twitches ... reflexively” and a brain that has 
“degenerated badly” with its cavities “filling with cerebro-spinal fluid.”37 “All 
four of her limbs are severely contracted; her fingernails cut into her wrists. She 
is incontinent of bowel and bladder.”38 This factual account strongly supports 
the dissenters’ central idea that “Dying is personal. And it is profound. For 
many, the thought of an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent. A quiet, 
proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.”39 
Students sometimes find it difficult to imagine how a case story might differ 
from the one recounted in the judge’s opinion. But before there was an opinion, 
there was a hotly contested case, with a legal question yet to be answered. Law 
student readers may easily be taken in by the judicial “rhetoric of inevitability” 
identified by Robert Ferguson as a regular occurrence in judicial opinions.40 
One tactic for undermining the rhetoric of inevitability, and highlighting 
the lawyer’s skill of telling a persuasive story, is to give the class a lower-court 
opinion to read that has (unbeknownst to them) been reversed on appeal. An 
example in family law is the case of Thomas S. v. Robin Y., in which two lesbian 
women arranged with a gay male friend to be a sperm donor for one of the 
women.41 After a successful artificial insemination, a female child named Ry 
was born.42 The women and Thomas S. agreed that he would not interfere 
with their parenting, and that he might interact with the child only if they 
later decided to invite him to do so.43 The invitation came, when the child was 
three.44 Thomas visited with the child over the next six years before asking 
34. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
35. Id. at 263-64.
36. Id. at 265.
37. Id. at 301.
38. Id. at 311 n.10 (internal citations omitted).
39. Id. at 310-11.
40. Robert Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 YaLe J.L. & humaN. 201, 213-16 (1990).
41. 599 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Fam. Ct., 1993), rev’d, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y.A.D. 1994).
42. Id. at 378.
43. Id. at 378-79.
44. Id. at 379.
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the women if he could take the child to visit his parents.45  They refused, and 
decided to terminate his visits.46 He sued to establish paternity and to resume 
visitation.47
The family court judge issued a reported opinion in favor of the women 
and told the story of the case from their perspective.48 I give the students 
the family court opinion to read (not the Appellate Division opinion in the 
case), and ask them to consider how the lawyer for Thomas S. would relate 
the story of the case, assuming the truth of the facts related by the family 
court opinion. The lawyer for Thomas S. had a sound basis for insisting that 
the most significant facts favored his client. Students must consider which 
facts would be highlighted, and which facts minimized, in order to make 
Thomas’s claim sound most persuasive. The key to his story are the years after 
the women invited him to form a relationship with the girl, and the constancy 
and strength of that relationship over the years.49 Students must resist the trial 
judge’s attempt to place the focus of the story on the initial agreement that 
seemed to show Thomas’s indifference to the child, and the first three years 
of the child’s life, in which he had no part.50 The appellate court did shift 
the focus to favor Thomas, finding the women should have been equitably 
estopped from denying Thomas a role in the child’s life.51
The class may also consider questions about evidence to be gathered in 
making the claim. What might a lawyer look for, in trying to establish the 
existence of a close, loving relationship between Thomas and Ry? Students 
may rarely think about evidence outside the rules learned in a formal evidence 
course, but lawyers always think about sources of good evidence. The attorney 
for a man claiming parental status might try to find every email, Christmas 
card, photo, birthday greeting, thank-you note for gifts, etc., paying special 
attention to the tone of the contacts. Of great importance would be the search 
for affectionate phrases and terms of endearment employed by each of them, 
with the child’s use of the terms like “I love you” and “daddy” being the 
equivalent of striking an evidentiary vein of gold. 
Lengthier Statement of the Facts
Lawyers must also compose lengthier accounts of case facts for jury 
summations, and trial and appellate briefs. Appellate opinions do not readily 
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 377.
48. Id. at 377-82.
49. Id. at 379.
50. “In July 1982, Sandra R., Robin Y., and the children moved back to New York. Until 
February 1985, they had virtually no contact with Thomas S. Thus, he did not hear about 
Ry’s early development.” Id. at 378-79.
51. Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y.A.D. 1994). 
Discussing Advocacy Skills
216 Journal of Legal Education
lend themselves to teaching this task, but some may be used to illustrate its 
importance. One opinion that does this, and allows the instructor to alert 
students to the role of the lawyer in anticipating the course of the litigation 
and creating a strategic advantage for his client, is Davis v. Monroe County Board 
of Education.52 A five-justice majority of the U.S. Supreme Court announced 
that school districts could be liable for student-on-student harassment, under 
federal law, if the harassment were “so severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive” that it prevented the victim from taking advantage of access to 
the local school system.53 As part of the claim, a plaintiff would also have to 
prove that the school officials knew of the harassment and failed to address 
the problem, instead showing “deliberate indifference to known acts” of 
harassment.54 
Because the lower court had decided the case on a motion to dismiss under 
F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), the court noted that it would accept the facts pleaded in 
the complaint as true, for purposes of the motion.55 Plaintiff’s lawyer wisely 
wrote much more than a bare-bones pleading; the lengthy complaint told 
a compelling story of harassment, with an array of specific incidents of in-
school harassment suffered by a fifth-grade girl at the hands of a particularly 
obnoxious boy seated next to her in class.56 The plaintiff’s complaint recalls 
the old adage that “if the law is on your side, pound on the law; if the facts 
are on your side, pound on the facts.”57 The plaintiff’s lawyers pounded on 
the facts, and the court’s five-justice majority responded, making eighteen 
references to paragraphs of the complaint.58 The majority opinion quoted the 
allegations concerning the boy’s vulgar remarks (crediting the fifth-grader 
with such gems as “I want to get in bed with you” and “I want to feel your 
boobs”), and described the allegations concerning his offensive conduct (e.g., 
placing a doorstop in his pants).59 The opinion also detailed the allegations 
about the school’s brazen refusal to do anything to help the victim, despite 
repeated requests by the girl and by her parents.60 Thanks in no small measure 
to the detailed factual complaint drafted by a lawyer who saw the strategic 
importance of creating a persuasive document to help his case, the plaintiff’s 
claim narrowly survived a motion to dismiss.61 
52. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
53. Id. at 630.
54. Id. at 633.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 633-36.
57. In the version I heard long ago, the adage concluded, “If neither the facts nor the law are on 
your side, pound on the table.” americaN foLkLore: aN eNcYcLopedia 908-09 (Jan Harold 
Brunvand ed. 1996).
58. Davis,  526 U.S. at 633-36.
59. Id. at 633-34.
60. Id. at 635.
61. Id. at 653-54.
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The Court’s reliance on the lawyer’s complaint in Davis contrasts sharply 
with the Oregon Supreme Court’s treatment of the complaints in Burnette v. 
Wahl, where three cases alleging child neglect were consolidated for appeal.62 
The plaintiff children sought damages for the emotional harm inflicted by their 
mothers, who were alleged to have deserted and neglected them.63  This was 
a claim of first impression, and plaintiffs’ counsel could certainly anticipate a 
motion to dismiss based upon the failure to state a claim.64  The complaints 
were described by the court as “substantially identical” and contained general 
statements that the mothers had “neglected the plaintiff by negligently 
leaving ... unattended in or at a place for such period of time as would have 
been likely to endanger the health or welfare of the plaintiff, in violation of 
ORS 163.545.”65 The lawyer for the children had drafted pleadings that were 
virtually fact-free, instead of providing facts that might have made judges feel 
the pain and suffering of these particular children.66 The children lost their 
case.67 The judges, unconstrained by facts, wrote: “There are probably as many 
children who have been damaged in some manner by their parents’ failure to 
meet completely their physical, emotional, and psychological needs as there 
are people.”68 The lawyer for the children failed to make their mental suffering 
come to life, missing the opportunity to draw unique, compelling portraits of 
each child’s individual life tragedy. 
Some cases illustrate how differently majority and dissenting opinions 
depict the story of the case. In Santosky v. Kramer, the Supreme Court had to 
determine the proper standard of proof for cases seeking to terminate parental 
rights.69 The parents in the case had mistreated their children in a number 
of ways that were, to say the least, shocking.70 A majority opinion favoring 
the defendant parents rejected the usual standard in civil cases of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and required the state to prove its case by clear 
and convincing evidence.71 The opinion characterized the parents’ misdeeds as 
62. 588 P.2d 1105 (Or. 1978).
63. Id. at 1107.
64. Id. at 1108 (“Preliminary to a more detailed discussion, it should benoted that these claims 
of parental failure are different from those tort claims usually made upon behalf of children 
against parents. The adjudicated cases concern physical or emotional injuries resulting 
from physical acts inflicted upon children such as beatings and rapes and from automobile 
accidents. Plaintiffs admit they can cite no cases permitting them to recover from their 
parents for solely emotional or psychological damage resulting from failure to support, 
nurture and care for them.”).
65. Id. at 1107.
66. Id. at 1107-08.
67. Id. at 1112.
68. Id. at 1111.
69. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
70. Id. at 781 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 767-71.
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simply “incidents reflecting parental neglect.”72 This minimizing phrase served 
to downplay the parents’ severe parenting deficits. The opinion took advantage 
of the definition of “neglect” (which could include infliction of serious physical 
harm) in the state statute to avoid the more common understanding of what 
the parents did, that is, commit child abuse.73 The dissent, advocating less 
procedural protection for the parents, described the particulars in more direct 
and graphic terms that depicted serious injuries, fractured bones, cuts on 
the foot, blisters on the hands, bruises on the arms, forehead and spine, and 
multiple pinpricks on the back.74 Students readily grasp the idea that such a 
gruesome factual account makes the case for giving the parents enhanced due 
process rights much less appealing.
Persuasive Advocacy
What convinces an audience? What distinguishes a persuasive argument 
from what Abraham Lincoln once called “strings of words meant to pass 
for arguments”?75 In the practice of law, one must take a position, defend 
it, and enlist others in its support. How should the argument be structured, 
phrased, pitched? What are its elements, how strong is each one, where are the 
vulnerabilities and how can they be managed? For every case, in every field of 
law, there is the work of advocacy to be done, fashioning the argument in its 
best possible dress. 
Judicial opinions themselves are examples of persuasive efforts, since judges 
write in part to convince their readers that the decision being rendered is the 
best one to be made according to the law. In a doctrinal course it is certainly 
possible to point out some basic tactics of persuasion in court opinions, and 
some ideas for doing so are suggested here.
Narrowing the Claim
Judicial opinions may describe the legal claim made by the plaintiff as 
if there were only one way to frame the relevant claim. This hides from the 
student’s view the important work of the lawyer in framing a claim, and the 
choices lawyers have in stating a claim (and sometimes, the choices judges 
make in characterizing the claim so as to make their judgments seem correct). 
One way for a lawyer to lose a potentially winnable case is to overstate the 
claim, making the case vulnerable to arguments that would not be relevant to 
a more narrowly stated claim. An example is a New York case, Morone v. Morone, 
in which a nonmarital co-habitant sought property division and support upon 
breakup of the relationship (“palimony”).76 Four years before the case, in the 
72. Id. at 750.
73. See N.Y. fam. cT. acT § 1012(f) (2015).
74. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 781 n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. Abraham Lincoln, Speech to the One Hundred Fortieth Indiana Regiment (March 17, 
1865), in 8 coLLecTed works 360-62 (Roy P. Basler ed. 1953).
76. 50 N.Y.2d 481 (1980).
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celebrated opinion in Marvin v. Marvin, the California Supreme Court had held 
that all co-habitants in the state could make such claims, as a matter of implied 
contract, express contract, or equity between the parties.77  The New York Court 
of Appeals had previously recognized express contracts between co-habitants 
as valid, but had not approved the use of any other theories of recovery.78 The 
lawyer for the plaintiff in the case, a woman named Frances Morone (she used 
the last name of her co-habitant, Frank Morone), simply asked the court to 
adopt the Marvin rule for the state of New York.79 Her lawyer failed to win 
recognition for claims based on anything other than an express contract.80 The 
Court of Appeals had multiple objections to the broad recognition of all co-
habitation claims, including concerns about fraud by the claiming party and 
difficulty in obtaining reliable evidence about the intentions and expectations 
of co-habitants.81 
Students may be asked how the claim of Ms. Morone could have been 
framed in a much more narrow way to allay the concerns that a smart lawyer 
should anticipate the claim might raise. Instead of seeking recognition for all 
co-habitants, plaintiff’s lawyer could have narrowed the claim to cover only 
those long-term co-habitants whose intentions and reasonable expectations 
were clear. The Morones had lived together for 23 years, and raised two 
children in that time.82 The intention to share their lives was not speculative, 
or subject to fabrication; they had already lived a major portion of their lives 
together and demonstrated their intention to create a family together. Broadly 
claiming a right for all co-habitants meant including in the legal claim short-
term partners living together without serious commitments to each other, and 
youthful partners experimenting with co-habitation, perhaps intending merely 
to see if they were suited for a possible marriage together. These tentative co-
habitation relationships, with their varying degrees of commitment to a shared 
future, would inevitably cause a court that was more conservative than the 
Marvin court to hesitate. Marvin involved adult co-habitants with no children 
who lived together for a relatively short term.83 The facts in the Morone case 
were much stronger, and the woman’s lawyer could have framed the claim in a 
much narrower and more favorable way for his client. 
A case that may reflect some law students’ high school experience is Brown 
v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions Inc.84 In this case, a public high school brought a 
77. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
78. Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 486 (1980).
79. Id. at 484-85.
80. Id. at 484.
81. Id. at 488-89.
82. Id. at 483-84.
83. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106.
84. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
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group onto campus to speak to students about AIDS prevention.85 The group, 
according the complaint filed by two 15-year-old students and their parents, 
spoke about sex in very explicit and casual terms: 
Plaintiffs allege that [instructor] Landolphi gave sexually explicit monologues 
and participated in sexually suggestive skits with several minors chosen from 
the audience. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Landolphi: 1) told 
the students that they were going to have a “group sexual experience, with 
audience participation”; 2) used profane, lewd, and lascivious language to 
describe body parts and excretory functions; 3) advocated and approved 
oral sex, masturbation, homosexual sexual activity, and condom use during 
promiscuous premarital sex; 4) simulated masturbation; 5) characterized the 
loose pants worn by one minor as “erection wear”; 6) referred to being in 
“deep sh—” after anal sex; 7) had a male minor lick an oversized condom with 
her, after which she had a female minor pull it over the male minor’s entire 
head and blow it up; 8) encouraged a male minor to display his “orgasm face” 
with her for the camera; 9) informed a male minor that he was not having 
enough orgasms; 10) closely inspected a minor and told him he had a “nice 
butt”; and 11) made eighteen references to orgasms, six references to male 
genitals, and eight references to female genitals.86
The parents’ claim, according to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, was that defendants “violated their privacy right to direct the 
upbringing of their children and educate them in accord with their own 
views.”87 The court inveighed against any asserted constitutional right that 
would result in parents of public school students “prescribing what the state 
shall teach their children.”88 Supreme Court precedents, the court declared, 
did not “encompass a broad-based right to restrict the flow of information in 
the public schools.”89 
Students find that narrowing down the claim is tricky. The plaintiffs needed 
to avoid the appearance that they were trying to dictate the curriculum or limit 
topics like AIDS prevention that the school might choose to cover. Perhaps 
the better approach would be to shift the claim’s focus from the general topic 
of AIDS education to the specific values communicated by this particular 
program–a program that arguably did not merely convey information about 
sex and AIDS, but condoned and encouraged sexual activity, and even 
sexual promiscuity, by minors. This restructured claim might have improved 
the parents’ chances of success, though we don’t know how the court would 
have responded to such a claim. But students see how knowing legal doctrine 
(about public school curricula and parental rights) helps lawyers to plan a 
legal strategy and put their clients in the best litigation position they can. 
85. Id. at 529.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 532.
88. Id. at 534.
89. Id. 
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Naming and Labeling the Parties
Judicial opinions always identify the parties to the proceeding. This routine 
act masks a key question for an advocate, i.e., how to name the parties in the 
case. A common choice is first to identify the parties by their full names, and 
then use only their last names. Another choice is to use the terms “plaintiff” and 
“defendant.” These choices are so habitual that students may not appreciate 
the other options available to advocates, who are the first ones in the case 
to choose names and labels for the parties. Some judicial opinions may help 
show students various strategic choices.
A striking example of labeling of a party occurred in a Pennsylvania case, 
Ferguson v. McKiernan.90 A woman who had separated from her husband began 
an affair with another man.91 When the affair ended, they remained friends, 
and at some point she asked him to be a sperm donor for her, promising that 
she would be solely responsible for the child and he would have no financial 
or other obligations.92 She misled the IVF physician into believing that she 
intended to have the child with her husband and that her husband was the 
sperm provider.93 She gave birth to twins and identified her husband as the 
father on the birth certificate (she was divorced from him at the time).94 Five 
years later, she sued her friend for child support.95 
The Court of Common Pleas found that the woman told conflicting stories 
to her doctor, her husband, and her friend.96 The judge concluded that 
plaintiff’s “fraud, deceit, lies and misrepresentations lulled this sperm donor 
into paternity.”97 Nevertheless, the judge found the donor was the twins’ legal 
father and under state law he was liable for child support.98 
In the trial judge’s opinion, the donor was called “the defendant.”99 On 
appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, he became “the appellant.”100 
But on further appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania he was referred 
to not by his name, or his litigation status as defendant or appellant, but by 
his role in the procreative act–throughout the opinion, he was called “Sperm 
Donor.”101 This appellation helped the reluctant father by defining him by his 
90. 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).
91. Id. at 1239.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1239-40.
94. Id. at 1240.
95. Id. at 1238.
96. Ferguson v. McKiernan, 60 Pa. D. & C. 4th 353, 360 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2002).
97. Id. at 355 n.1.
98. Id. at 363-64.
99.  Id. at 354.
100.  Ferguson v. McKiernan, 855 A.2d 121, 122 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
101.  Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1238 (Pa. 2007).
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intentionally limited act in the procreation of the twins. The state supreme 
court acknowledged his limited role and relieved Mr. Sperm Donor of any 
child support liability.102
Another example is provided by Dunphy v. Gregor, the case discussed 
previously in which plaintiff Eileen Dunphy sued for damages for emotional 
distress when she witnessed a negligent driver kill her fiancé Michael Burwell 
while he was changing a tire on the side of the road.103 The state supreme court 
had previously allowed such a claim to be made by a mother who witnessed 
the death of her child, but Dunphy sought to extend such “bystander 
liability” beyond the orbit of traditional family members.104 The case presents 
an opportunity to study the functioning of a common law court in deciding 
whether to extend an existing doctrine to a new set of facts. It also offers the 
chance to briefly highlight an important point about identifying parties.
In the intermediate appellate court, the judges described Ms. Dunphy 
as “plaintiff” and James Gregor as “defendant.”105 The deceased is called 
“Michael Burwell” and then simply “Burwell.”106  In the New Jersey Supreme 
Court opinion, plaintiff is identified as “Eileen” and her fiancé is “Michael.”107 
The use of first names for the couple personalizes their story, implies they 
are young, and helps create goodwill toward the innocent young woman so 
grievously harmed by the roadside killing. The alleged tortfeasor is simply, 
and coldly, called “defendant, James Gregor.”108 The label identifies him only 
by his role as the accused wrongdoer in the litigation, and certainly creates no 
sympathy for him. 
These cases show some of the possibilities of using naming and labeling 
to support one’s case. In other fields of law, different options may exist. The 
defendant in a case involving a dispute over repairs to an apartment, for 
example, might be identified by plaintiff’s attorney as simply “the Landlord.” 
A corporate entity in a business dispute may be labeled “the Corporation.” 
These titles don’t generate much warmth or positive regard in our society. 
In a jury trial, jurors might be expected to identify more with tenants and 
consumers than with Landlords, Corporations, Directors, Banks, Employers, 
or others that bring to mind bureaucratic, large, wealthy, impersonal entities.
A criminal law case in Tennessee makes the point in an amusing way. The 
prosecution sought to have the court order that its client not be referred to 
as the “government,” perhaps out of concern for anti-government sentiment 
102. Id.
103. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994). 
104. Id. at 373.
105. Dunphy v. Gregor, 617 A.2d 1248, 1250 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1992).
106. Id.
107. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 373 (N.J. 1994).
108. Id.
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in a conservative venue.109 The defense lawyer vigorously opposed the ban, 
responding not only with legal argument but with pointed counter-suggestions 
for renaming both his client and himself.110 For his client, he suggested as one 
possibility the label “the Citizen Accused,” noting that the term “defendant” 
had unfortunate connotations of guilt.111 Instead of “the defense” he proposed 
the term “the Resistance.”112 Defense counsel himself would then be “the 
Leader of the Resistance.”113 The court, no doubt with a smile, denied the 
prosecutor’s motion.114
Counseling
While cases don’t directly teach about lawyer-client counseling, professors 
may generate valuable discussions about this aspect of the job of lawyers using 
traditional case materials.115 
Consider, for example, the notorious child custody case pitting film 
director Woody Allen against his ex-companion, actress Mia Farrow.116 At 
stake was custody of three children, two adopted by the couple and one their 
natural child.117 The trial judge, in awarding custody of the children to Ms. 
Farrow, took Woody to task for his woefully inadequate knowledge about 
the children.118 He did not know the names of the children’s friends, teachers, 
pets, pediatrician, or dentist.119 One of the three children had a history of 
109. Joe Patrice, This Is How You Shame Prosecutors For Their Stupid Motion, aBove 
The Law (Oct. 31, 2013, 10:16 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/
this-is-how-you-shame-prosecutors-for-their-stupid-motion/.
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Debra Cassens Weiss, Call me Captain Justice: Lawyer Requests Euphemisms After Prosector Seeks Ban 
on ‘Government’ Word, a.B.a.J. (Nov. 4, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/call_me_captain_justice_lawyer_requests_euphemisms.
115. Counseling can also appear in lawyer-prepared documents, as impressively demonstrated by 
one practitioner who created a letter to a client and a settlement document that were designed 
to help her clients care well for their children and avoid future custody litigation. Patricia 
Riesenburger, Remembering the Children in a Dissolution Proceeding, fLa. B.J., March 1990 at 33. 
The documents advised clients about what parental behaviors would benefit their children 
and be viewed favorably by the court should disputes over custody or visitation rights arise 
in the future. Id. at 33-34. The advice is consistent with judicial opinions describing the kind 
of parental conduct that caused parents in such disputes to lose credibility in the eyes of the 
judge. 
116. Allen v. Farrow, No. 68738/92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 7, 1993), available at http://www.scribd.
com/doc/205403621/Allen-v-Farrow-Custody-Ruling-June-7-1993.
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. at 15-33.
119. Id. at 16.
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cerebral palsy, but Woody did not even know if the boy had a doctor.120 He 
rarely communicated with most of their brothers and sisters (other children of 
Mia’s).121  Compounding his litigation problems was the fact that Woody was 
sleeping with one of the sisters, Mia’s child adopted from Korea, Soon-Yi.122 
Not surprisingly, things did not go well for Woody Allen at trial. None of 
Woody’s own witnesses would give their opinion that he should be granted 
custody.123 Woody’s testimony in response to his own lawyer’s question 
(“Can you tell the court why you are seeking custody of your children?”) was 
described by the judge as “a rambling non sequitur which consumed eleven 
pages of transcript.”124 Part of his answer pledged that the children’s “day-to-
day behavior will be done in consultation with their therapists.”125  In sum, 
Woody Allen came across as the archetypal uninvolved parent, unfamiliar 
with the basic daily lives of his children and insensitive to their feelings about 
the affair with their sister and the public attacks on their mother’s character 
and parenting abilities. The judge condemned this father’s “self-absorption, 
his lack of judgment and his commitment to the continuation of his divisive 
assault, thereby impeding the healing of the injuries that he has already caused 
....”126 
A case like this, where a client proposes a perhaps strongly felt but poorly 
conceived course of action, can set the stage for an exploration in class of a 
delicate task for a lawyer, counseling against the client’s desired action. In 
this case, we have no information about the lawyer-client conversations, but 
students can speculate about possible options for the lawyer. A lawyer might 
offer legal reasons the planned action won’t succeed, and might in fact set the 
judge against the client. Beyond the legal consequences, what of the effects 
on the client’s relationships, his reputation, and his pocketbook? Woody 
Allen faced more than the loss of his case. The litigation itself, and the way he 
prosecuted it, might damage what he was presumably most concerned about, 
his ability to serve in the role of father to his three children. And he had other 
interests at stake as well. Because of his celebrity, the case was bound to draw 
mass media attention, negatively affecting his own reputation with members 
of the general public who pay to see his films. Finally, fully litigating any 
lawsuit carries enormous financial costs (though someone as rich as Woody 
120. Id.
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 8-9.
123. Id. at 17.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 19.
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Allen might be willing to absorb them).127 All of these “talking points” might 
be used to counsel a client not to pursue an unwise course of action.128
Another case, Matter of Baby Girl W., raises a ticklish question of counseling and 
legal ethics.129 A couple seeking to adopt a child were caught misrepresenting 
their finances, educational attainments, and employment histories. They failed 
to exhibit any remorse for their false statements.130 Students might be asked 
to imagine the lawyer-client discussion before the couple give their testimony. 
Can the lawyer advise the clients to show remorse, by directly suggesting it? 
This would seem to be suborning perjury. What about informing the clients 
that courts are more lenient with those who show remorse, without directly 
counseling such testimony? Or telling them about a prior case in which the 
court was impressed with the show of remorse expressed by an adoptive parent 
who lied about her background because of her desperate desire to love and 
care for a child?131
Dealing with Experts
Cases often feature expert testimony, and lawyers must learn to understand 
the uses and limits of expertise. In family law, the expertise offered is often 
in psychology, and students without a background in the subject may think 
the lawyer’s role is simply to call upon experts when needed and accept all 
they say. I try to use the cases to instill a more nuanced and critical view, while 
respecting the importance and value of well-founded expert testimony. 
A judicial opinion that relies significantly on such testimony can be a good 
vehicle for raising a number of issues about how lawyers deal with experts. 
One example is a fascinating old case in family law, Painter v. Bannister.132 
Harold Painter was the father of a 5-year-old boy, Mark.133 Tragedy struck when 
Painter’s wife and daughter were killed in an automobile crash.134 Painter asked 
127. In fact, Allen was ordered to pay Farrow’s counsel fees as well, in part because of the “relative 
lack of merit of Mr. Allen’s position in commencing this proceeding for custody.” Allen v. 
Farrow, 197 A.D.2d 327, 335 (N.Y. 1994).
128. Attorney Margaret Klaw, in her book about her cases as a family lawyer, amusingly describes 
things she’s talked clients out of, including submitting evidence that a mother buys clothes 
for the child at a thrift store, that the mother is a lesbian, that the father is an atheist, and 
that the father’s new girlfriend paints his daughter’s fingernails. margareT kLaw, keepiNg 
iT civiL 216-17 (2013).
129. 542 N.Y.S.2d 415 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
130. Id. at 416.
131. The couple in the case were able to adopt the child, because the majority felt that the most 
important evidence in the case was their proven ability to care for the child, who had been 
living with them for some time. Id. But the lying and lack of remorse led one judge to 
dissent. Id. at 416-17.
132. 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966). Professors may also want to read the plaintiff’s fascinating 
account of the case written a year after the decision. Hal Painter, mark, i Love You (1967).
133. 140 N.W.2d at 153.
134. Id.
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his wife’s parents, the Bannisters, to take Mark to live with them temporarily, 
in their Iowa home.135 They did so, but when Harold asked for the boy’s return 
two years later, the Bannisters refused to give Mark back to his father.136 The 
resulting custody battle went all the way to the Iowa Supreme Court.137 The 
court awarded custody to the Bannisters, stating it was much impressed by 
the testimony of Dr. Glenn R. Hawks, the eminent head of the department of 
child development at Iowa State University, whose testimony strongly favored 
the Bannisters.138 
The opinion recites that Hawks “spent approximately 25 hours acquiring 
information about Mark and the Bannisters, including appropriate testing of 
and ‘depth interviews’ with Mark.”139 Hawks concluded that Mark used Mr. 
Bannister as a father figure and was “confused” about the father figure in his 
life before Mr. Bannister.140 The expert voiced grave doubts about how well 
Mr. Painter could relate to Mark, “because he has got to build the relationship 
from scratch. There is essentially nothing on which to build at the present 
time. Mark is aware that Mr. Painter is his father, but he is not very clear about 
what this means.”141 Hawks predicted that Mark would do poorly if returned 
to his father based upon adoption studies that purportedly showed that “the 
majority of adoptions in children who are changed, from ages six to eight, 
will go bad if they have had a prior history of instability, some history of prior 
movement.”142  
I ask students to assume they represent Harold Painter. Dr. Hawks poses 
a substantial threat to their client’s case and to his relationship to his own 
son for many years to come. What might be the bases for challenging the 
testimony of Dr. Hawks? By phrasing the issue for discussion this way, the 
instructor signals students that they do not need to judge whether Hawks is 
right or wrong; they only must think about how his opinion may be subject to 
interrogation. 
Even without expertise, students can draw upon the intelligent use of 
common sense to identify several avenues to pursue in mounting a challenge 
to this expert. If a custody decision is a choice between alternative custodians, 
did Hawks have sufficient information with which to make this choice? What 
is missing, of course, is information about Mr. Painter, whom Dr. Hawks left 
out of his investigation. The expert drew conclusions about the father-son 
relationship without talking to the father or seeing the father and son interact 
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 156-58.
139. Id. at 157.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 157-58.
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with each other143–is that a proper inquiry? The expert did interview Mark144–
but are there reasons, other than the absence of any meaningful parental 
relationship, that Mark might appear to be confused when talking about his 
father to a psychologist? Is there a possible alternative explanation to the one 
offered by the expert, that the boy is confused about the relationship because 
there’s “nothing” to it anymore?145 The expert found Mr. Bannister to be a 
father figure146–does that necessarily mean Painter has been supplanted and 
is now of little importance to his son? And what of the reliance on adoption 
studies?147 Is there a dependable analogy to be drawn from an adoption 
situation to a case in which a 7-year-old son is returning to a father with whom 
he lived for his first five years of life? In a guided class discussion, students 
can see how the lawyer for Painter can question (i) the expert’s inadequate 
inquiry, (ii) the expert’s dubious explanations, and (iii) the expert’s deficient 
analogy.148
The distinguished jurist Charles Breitel, a former chief judge on the New 
York Court of Appeals, put the matter well when he wrote: “In custody 
matters parties and courts may be very dependent on the auxiliary services 
of psychiatrists, psychologists, and trained social workers. This is good. But 
it may be an evil when the dependence is too obsequious or routine or the 
experts too casual.”149
Conclusion
In traditional doctrinal courses in law school, coverage is broad and time 
is short. Basic courses, like my own in family law, cover a multitude of topics, 
and in addition to teaching doctrine, they impart important skills such as 
case analysis and case synthesis. Judicial opinions are the backbone of these 
courses. 
Despite the pressures of time, there is a way to incorporate discussion of 
other skills of the lawyer into these courses. I here suggest that in a modest but 
meaningful way, professors teaching doctrinal courses might inject into class 
143. Id. at 157 (“[Dr. Hawks] is criticized for reaching this conclusion without investigating the 
Painter home or finding out more about Mr. Painter’s character.”).
144. Id. at 157.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 157-58.
148. For other bases for challenging experts, see Thomas R. Litwak et al., The Proper Role of Psychology 
in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J. fam. L. 269 (1979-80); Stephen A. Newman, Assessing the Quality 
of Expert Testimony in Cases Involving Children, 22 J. psYchiaTrY & L. 181 (1994); Stephen A. 
Newman, The Use and Abuse of Social Science in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 49 N.Y.L. sch. L. rev. 
537 (2004). A case with an astonishingly thorough custody evaluation by a team of experts, 
including a memorable anecdote favoring one of the parties, is McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 
F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989).
149. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 (1976).
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discussions matters such as the role of the lawyer in gathering evidence, using 
narrative techniques in presenting evidence, stating legal claims, naming and 
labeling parties, counseling clients, and dealing with experts. 
A modest degree of discussion along the lines outlined in this essay might 
help show students the vital connections between reading judicial opinions in 
an academically rigorous manner, and practicing law in a creative, persuasive, 
and artful way.
